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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 Before us is the City of Philadelphia's appeal from the 
orders of the district court dated September 24, 1993 and 
September 30, 1993 entering an injunction governing the occupancy 
and conditions of confinement of the City's newly constructed 
prison facility denominated the Alternative and Special Detention 
Central Unit ("ASDCU").  This is one of a series of appeals taken 
by the City from related orders arising out of a consent decree 
and various revisions entered into between the City and the 
plaintiffs, a class of prisoners incarcerated in the Philadelphia 
prison system, to ameliorate the severe overcrowding and harsh 
conditions in the Philadelphia prisons.1  Although this appeal 
was argued at the same time as the other appeals, and the other 
appeals remain pending for disposition by this court, the court 
disposes of this appeal initially for reasons that will become 
clear hereafter. 
                     
1.  The other appeals are from an order adjudicating the City in 
contempt and imposing fines for noncompliance with an order 
requiring occupancy of a substance abuse and treatment facility 
(No. 94-2186); a series of orders adjudicating contempt and 
imposing stipulated penalties for failure to timely submit a 
Facilities Audit and Ten-Year Plan as required by the consent 
decree (Nos. 93-1997, 93-2116, 93-2117); and an adjudication of 
contempt and imposition of fines for modification of procedures 





 BACKGROUND OF THE CASE AND THE CONSENT DECREES 
 The complaint in this case was initially filed in 1982 
by a group of inmates suffering from alleged overcrowding at 
Holmesburg Prison.  Defendants in the case include the City of 
Philadelphia and various city officials charged with the 
responsibility of administering the Philadelphia prison system 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "the City").  In 1986, 
the plaintiff class was expanded to include all past, present and 
future inmates in the Philadelphia prison system, and the 
allegations of overcrowding were expanded to apply to the 
Philadelphia prison system as a whole.  There is also pending a 
somewhat parallel action in the Philadelphia Court of Common 
Pleas which found, some twenty years ago, that conditions in the 
Philadelphia prison system violated the prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and which retains control over aspects of the 
prison system pursuant to a consent decree entered by the City 
and representatives of that plaintiff class.2 
 On November 14, 1986, the plaintiff class in the 
federal case and the City entered into a Settlement Agreement.  
On December 30, 1986, the district court approved the Settlement 
Agreement and entered a Consent Order (the "1986 Consent Decree") 
                     
2.  We note, however, that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania took 
cognizance of findings of "vast improvements in prison 
conditions" as a result of the remedial decrees entered into in 
that case.  See Jackson v. Hendrick, 503 A.2d 400, 407 (Pa. 
1986).  We offer no opinion on that issue. 
 
 
consistent with its terms.  Among other things, the 1986 Consent 
Decree provided for the construction of a downtown 440-bed 
detention facility by December 31, 1990 and established a maximum 
allowable population ("MAP") of 3,750 inmates for the then-
existing facilities of the Philadelphia prison system.  See App. 
at 91-92.  
 Five years after the entry of the 1986 Consent Decree, 
the City had not complied with many of its provisions, including 
the provision requiring construction of the 440-bed facility and 
the provision establishing the MAP.  In 1991, the parties entered 
into a new Stipulation and Agreement approved by the district 
court which entered another Consent Order consistent with its 
terms (the "1991 Consent Decree") and which contained a series of 
remedial decrees and stipulations aimed at alleviating the 
overcrowding and conditions in the prison system. 
 The 1991 Consent Decree relieved the City of its 
obligation under the 1986 Consent Decree to construct the 440-bed 
detention facility.  Instead, the 1991 Consent Decree imposed, 
among other things, the following requirements: 
 11. Defendants shall conduct expeditiously the orderly 
planning process set forth in the document 
entitled "Prison Planning Process" attached as an 
Appendix hereto and incorporated herein by 
reference.  Defendants shall thereafter construct 
or arrange for such new facilities and close or 
renovate existing facilities in accordance with 
the plans produced pursuant to the Prison Planning 
Process and approved by the Court. 
 
          . . . . 
 
 14. Defendants shall construct a new prison facility 
or facilities capable of housing in the aggregate 
 
 
at least 1,000 inmates by May 25, 1994.  Such 
construction shall be planned pursuant to the 
Prison Planning Process. 
 
 App. at 114-15. (emphasis added). 
The "Prison Planning Process" set forth in the Appendix to the 
1991 Consent Decree includes the following provision: 
 C. The defendants shall develop physical and 
operational standards for the operation of their 
facilities.  Defendants shall then apply these 
standards when making the evaluations and 
construction plans called for in subparagraphs 1-4 
below.  Such standards shall comply with 
constitutional standards and requirements for the 
incarceration of sentenced prisoners and pretrial 
detainees, where applicable, and shall comply with 
correctional industry standards of the American 
Correctional Association (ACA), with reference to 
those of the American Jail Association (AJA), the 
Federal Department of Justice (DOJ), the American 
Public Health Association (APHA), the American 
Medical Association (AMA), and the American Bar 
Association (ABA). 
 




 FACTS LEADING TO THIS APPEAL 
 The City decided in late 1992 to double the capacity of 
the new facility it was required to construct by the 1991 Consent 
Decree from 1000 to 2000 beds.  App. at 781.  In order to build 
the second 1000 beds, however, the City needed to demolish Laurel 
Hall, which housed 175 inmates.  App. at 781.  Because Laurel 
Hall formed an integral part of the MAP limits set forth in the 
Consent Decree, the City sought court approval of a plan to 
relocate Laurel Hall inmates.  Supp. App. at 1175-77, App. at 
464-65.  The district court required that the City develop a plan 
for the inmates before razing Laurel Hall.  App. at 456, 749-50, 
821. 
   On March 17, 1993 the City submitted a program 
outline and plan drawings for the construction of the ASDCU, a 
pre-fabricated modular facility, designed as a minimum security 
facility to house 192 inmates.  On April 30, 1993 the City 
presented these plans to the court, apparently in chambers, 
through its architect and a City official and there was a 
discussion of space requirements, food service, and the target 
date for demolition of Laurel Hall.  App. at 733-64.  
   Although the court-appointed consultant commented that 
the plans were "consistent with the physical and operational 
standards," App. at 761, after the April 30, 1993 presentation 
the plaintiffs, pursuant to the court's invitation to communicate 
their concerns, objected, inter alia, to the number of inmates 
the City proposed to house at the ASDCU.  The crux of the dispute 
 
 
concerns whether the three wings of the proposed facility were 
multiple occupancy cell/rooms within ACA standards, which 
plaintiffs contended could house no more than 50 inmates each, or 
64-bed dormitories, which the City's consultants believed 
appropriate.   
 There followed a series of meetings by the parties with 
the special master, culminating in what the City calls a 
"conference" and what the plaintiffs call a "hearing" on 
September 22, l993.  This occurred two days before the City had 
scheduled to move the Laurel Hall prison population to the ASDCU.  
The parties discussed with the district court a variety of issues 
related to occupancy in the new facility, including smoking by 
inmates and activities programs to mitigate the density of the 
ASDCU population.  App. at 1114, 1134-38, 1142-49, 1156-83.  
During and at the conclusion of the discussion, the district 
court expressly requested that the City submit a motion for a 
variance from the ACA standards, but despite counsel's agreement 
to do so no such motion was forthcoming.  
 The district court indicated that it would limit the 
number of inmates at the ASDCU to 168, which could be increased 
to 192 upon the City's application to the court if the City  
could demonstrate that at least 163 of them were participating in 
jobs or work.  App. at 1170.  The court referred to the "draft of 
an order" which would be forwarded for comment, App. at 1187, but 
it is unclear whether a draft order was prepared or comments were 
received from the parties. 
 
 
   On September 24, 1993, however, the court issued a 
sua sponte order (hereinafter "the September 24 Order") which 
recited the facts deemed relevant to the ASDCU dispute, including 
reference to the hearing of September 22, 1993, the report of the 
court's "independent consultant," and the court's own tour of the 
ASDCU facility, and which "allowed" the occupancy of ASDCU by 
more than 150 inmates on specified terms and conditions.  These 
included (1) the classification of inmates assigned to the ASDCU, 
(2) provision for food services satisfactory to the City's Health 
Department, with the court "expect[ing] copies of inspection 
reports by the Health Department," (3) provision of adequate 
ventilation for smoking rooms and "monthly tests of air quality 
to assure compliance," (4) the provision of work tables and 
seating in at least three work stations, (5) provision of 
volunteer outdoor recreation of no less than two hours after the 
evening meal, and (6) certain staffing of ASDCU.  The district 
court then set a maximum allowable population for ASDCU at 168 as 
long as 80% of the inmates had work or school activities six 
hours per day, five days per week within ten days of arrival.   
   The September 24 Order also included provisions by 
which the City could request a population increase to 192 upon 
the City's representation that 85% of the inmates will be 
assigned program activities (i.e. work or schooling), and (2) the 
provision of voluntary activities other than religious 
programming, "such as AA/NA, Smoke-enders, parenting, literacy 
training (Hooked on Phonics or the equivalent), [and] arts and 
crafts," for two hours per day.  The court also ordered that the 
 
 
City submit a compliance report and a plan within 60 days, and 
set a hearing within 90 days.  Finally, the court granted the 
City permission to proceed with the demolition of Laurel Hall 
upon transfer of the prisoners in accordance with the terms of 
the Order. 
 On September 30, without any prompting from the 
parties, the district court issued a second sua sponte order 
requiring that daily reports be made available to the court upon 
request regarding issues covered by the September 24 order.  
These included, inter alia, with respect to the posts and 
staffing patterns, "a daily report of the number of posts each 
shift, the number of assigned staff reporting and the number of 
staff either reassigned or working overtime to replace non-
reporting staff,"  "[d]aily reports of the program activities 
provided, the number of inmates assigned to program activities, 
the number who actually report to their assignments as well as 
their names, and the number of hours spent in each assignment," 
and a "daily log of the times that the recreation yards are 
opened and closed."  The September 30 Order also established a 
schedule of fines for non-compliance with the terms of the 
September 24 Order.  The district court also required a 
compliance reporting plan in 60 days and scheduled a hearing for 
90 days.  Joint App. at 1334.   
 The City now appeals from the district court's orders 
of September 24 and September 30, 1993.  It grounds appellate 
jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a), and the plaintiffs agree 
 
 




 On appeal, the City contends as follows:  First, it 
argues that the district court erred in entering a permanent 
injunction governing the operations of the ASDCU sua sponte and 
without observing the fundamental procedural and evidentiary 
safeguards of the adversary process.  In support of that 
contention the City argues that the district court erred in 
disregarding the requirement to hold a hearing prior to entering 
a permanent injunction; in determining disputed issues of fact on 
the basis of non-record evidence; and that the September 24th and 
September 30th orders do not reflect "agreements reached," 
despite the characterization of the district court in the 
September 24th order, and that therefore their entry without a 
hearing cannot be justified on that basis.  It is the City's 
position that there was no voluntary meeting of the minds and 
that it was subject to a "Hobson's Choice" with an "undercurrent 
of coercion" because the district court had indicated it would 
not approve moving the Laurel Hall population to ASDCU without 
the conditions imposed and the City was faced with the need to 
raze Laurel Hall to meet its construction schedule. 
 The City contends next that the district court's 
interpretations of the consent decree and of the ACA standards 
were erroneous.  It contends, notwithstanding the language of the 
consent decree emphasized above, that the ASDCU was not required 
 
 
to meet the ACA standard under the consent decree and that in any 
event the ASDCU does not violate the ACA standard.  This argument 
depends upon resolution of the factual issue as to whether the 
wings are "multiple occupancy cells/rooms" or "multiple occupancy 
dormitories," a factual dispute as to which the City contends it 
did not have the opportunity to present evidence. 
 Finally, the City contends that the "conditions of 
confinement" imposed by the district court constitute 
impermissible judicial micromanagement of the operations of a 
county prison facility.  In support of this argument the City 
refers to the Supreme Court's emphasis on according great 
deference to the policies and opinions of prison administrators, 
and the strong separation of powers concerns heightened in this 
case by the important interests of federalism.  These are serious 
contentions, and although many of them are forcefully answered in 
the plaintiffs' brief it would have been helpful to this court if 
we had the benefit of the district court's consideration and its 
response.  Surprisingly, however, the City candidly concedes that 
"[t]he issues presented on appeal were not raised or adjudicated 
on the record in the district court."  Appellant's brief at 1 
n.1. 
 This court has consistently held that it will not 
consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal.  
See, e.g., Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1115 (3d Cir. 1993);  In re American 
Biomaterials Corp., 954 F.2d 919, 927-28 (3d. Cir. 1992); Frank 
v. Colt Industries, Inc., 910 F.2d 90, 100 (3d Cir. 1990); Flick 
 
 
v. Borg-Warner Corp., 892 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir. 1989); Newark 
Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 539 F.2d 929, 932 (3d Cir. 
1976).  This general rule "applies with added force where the 
timely raising of the issue would have permitted the parties to 
develop a factual record."  American Biomaterials, 954 F.2d at 
927-28.   
 The Supreme Court has frequently approved the 
application of such a rule, explaining that the rule against 
considering issues not raised before the district court is 
considered "essential in order that parties may have the 
opportunity to offer all the evidence they believe relevant to 
the issues . . . [and] in order that litigants may not be 
surprised on appeal by final decision there of issues upon which 
they have had no opportunity to introduce evidence."  Hormel v. 
Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941); see also Singleton v. Wulff, 
428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (noting that, when an argument was 
raised for the first time on appeal, "[w]e have no idea what 
evidence, if any, petitioner would, or could, offer in defense 
[of the argument]."). 
 The City's failure to raise these issues before the 
district court is surprising.  Indeed, the district court gave 
the City the opportunity to present again at least some of these 
issues by construing a request filed by the City for 
authorization to increase the population of ASDCU to 192 and to 
modify the reporting requirements as a motion under Rule 60(b) to 
relieve the defendants of certain provisions of the September 24, 
1993 Order.  See Order of June 27, 1994 at 8.  The district court 
 
 
cited authority it construed as depriving it of jurisdiction to 
rule on that motion.  See Venen v. Sweet, 758 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 
1985).  Because the City apparently wanted to insure that this 
court address not only the occupancy limit but also the related 
conditions imposed by the district court, in lieu of requesting 
this court to remand, the City has represented that it will 
withdraw its request pending before the district court. 
 The plaintiffs argue with some plausibility that at 
least some of the issues presented here by the City have been 
waived.  See, e.g., Appellees' Brief at 40 ("The City failed, at 
every stage prior to this appeal, to request a formal evidentiary 
hearing regarding the occupation of ASDCU.").  Had the City filed 
a Rule 60(b) motion, the district court would have had the 
opportunity to consider the substantial number of factual 
questions that are intertwined with the City's arguments, 
including, but not limited to, whether the ASDCU facility 
complied with ACA standards and whether the ACA standards or any 
other relevant standards incorporated the subjects addressed in 
the district court's orders; whether the City had a fair 
opportunity to present its experts on the issue of the 
characterization of the multi-unit rooms, and whether, on 
reflection, the decrees inappropriately involved the court in the 
micromanagement of a state institution.  See Halderman v. 
Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628, 637-39 (3d Cir. 
1982) (in banc) (declining to address a defense to a civil 
contempt citation that had not first been presented to the 
 
 
district court through a motion under Rule 60(b)), cert. denied, 
465 U.S. 1038 (1984). 
 Although we would have the undisputed discretion to 
view the City's failure to raise these issues in the district 
court as a waiver, a practice this court generally follows, in 
light of the strong public interest in the subject matter of 
these decrees, we will not do so in this instance.  See Selected 
Risks Insurance Co. v. Bruno, 718 F.2d 67, 69-70 (3d Cir. 1983). 
Nonetheless, we decline to address these significant issues until 
the district court has an opportunity to consider "the competing 
equities, . . . the strengths and weaknesses of the parties' 
positions, and . . . the imposition of conditions for relief from 
a judgment."  Pennhurst, 673 F.2d at 637.   
 A remand will give the district court the opportunity 
to address the City's vigorous arguments focused on, inter alia, 
the detail of the monitoring of the ASDCU facility.  Of course, 
in the present circumstances, we express no opinion regarding the 
propriety of the district court's Orders of September 24, 1993 
and September 30, 1993, and nothing that we have written should 
be construed as an opinion on the merits, which we do not reach. 
 IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will not affirm, reverse, 
or vacate the district court's orders of September 24, 1993 and 
September 30, 1993, but instead will remand this matter to the 
district court so that the City can file an appropriate motion. 
The mandate will issue forthwith.  Costs on appeal to be assessed 




                               
 
